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Abstract 
While there is only little transformation to the absolute power of the party-state to be detected, some grassroots 
democratic experiments, however, are receiving enormous attention of the world, especially village elections. 
Nevertheless, this preliminary exercise of democracy is widely characterized as a mixed bag of results. Since its 
first conduction, it has experienced immense development and bought great impact not only on different rural 
political institutions, but also on common mass villagers, as well as changes to the local governance. But at the 
same time, the limitations of the factual effectiveness of these elections can hardly be underestimated and such 
aspects as the standardization of electoral procedures are still to be further improved. Moreover, given the wide 
variations across Chinese countryside and the strong oppositions from all levels, the future of China’s village 
elections remain hard to gauge. 
Keywords: Chinese politics, Village election, Local governance, Rural politics 
1. Introduction 
As the Chinese economy has been enjoying a continuous development at an amazing speed during the last 30 
years, many people believe that China is a nation with significant importance whose economic prosperity, 
domestic stability and international responsibility will directly impact the Asia-Pacific region and even the whole 
world. At the same time, the expectation on expanding the so far successful reform from economic into political 
fields is also substancially rising, with a common anticipation that China, according to modernisation theory, 
will along with its global economic emergence inevitably adopt a more democratic model of governance as well. 
In contrast to the keen anticipations of many outside observers at the beginning of the 1990s, the political system 
of China experienced only remarkably little transformation during the last decade of the 20th century. Unlike the 
USSR and other communist east European countries, the succession of authority from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang 
Zemin, as well as from the latter to Hu Jintao have not induced a crisis leading the functioning of the political 
system into chaos. Against this seeming backdrop of stability, however, there has been more subtle and 
noteworthy changes to the system on which a number of scholars have expressed their hopes for a more tranquil 
political transformation, such as China's transition to a highly level of rule of law, new reform trends and new 
challenges under new leadership, as well as a larger scope of “democratic” governance at basic administrative 
levels in China. 
One of the aspects attracting more and more attention in recent years has been the continuing reform in the 
Chinese countryside, taking the already established direct elections of villagers’ committees (VCs, cunmin 
weiyuanhui) and a few cases of direct elections for township mayors as an example. Rural China is often the 
subject of incongruous and paradoxical descriptions ranging from peasant resistance, cadre corruption, social 
disorder and, surprisingly, deepening democratisation processes. Each depiction contains only a partial truth 
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individually or collectively, yet with the focus on that part of the picture, the rural democracy through elections 
or contrarily the lack of it, a holistic understanding of other phenomena is more easily to be arrived at.   
Village elections in China have been the focus of much excitement among Western scholars. To many, such 
elections hold out the promise of genuine democracy taking hold in China, starting at the village level and, as 
both Western and Chinese democrats hope, one day moving up even to the national level. Others are more 
cautiously skeptical, suggesting that such elections only entrench the leadership of the Communist Party. There 
has been an interesting debate around the meaning of village elections ever since their introduction in 1988. 
Björn Alpermann (2009), John J. Kennedy (2002, 2007), Li Lianjiang and Kevin O’Brien (2008), and Melanie 
Manion (2009) have all presented analyses of village elections, including observations of actual electoral 
practice, and more importantly, reflection on the relationship of such elections to Communist Party leadership. 
Recent examples of elections of township heads and township party secretaries have caused further debate. 
Kevin O’Brien and Han Rongbin (2009), Tan Qingshan (2006), as well as He Baogang (2007) examine the 
politics conducting village elections and introducing township elections, again with a view toward prospects for 
further democratization in rural China. Most of the sources above provide nuanced commentary on the 
relationship of elections in China to a transformed manner of rural governance, or further to the possible 
emergence of democracy. Based on a survey of recent Western literature on village elections in China and an 
evaluation of some of the arguments made, this essay will argue that the village elections in China have imposed 
great impact on various political grassroots institutions, mass villagers, as well as the local governance in 
general.  
2. Transformation and Development Since the Last Decades 
During the years of the reform era, Chinese rural society has undergone dramatic transformations, ranging from 
urbanization, emergence of the new rich, increasing of the income gap and social conflicts to plural economical 
and political interests. In the context of these changes, rural politics has also inevitably experienced great 
development and modification, including the conduction of VC elections, the formation of self-governing 
committees, the enhancement of people’s awareness of political participation and the changing relationship 
between villages, townships, as well as village Party branchs.  
Historically, rural China can be seen as lacking a democratic tradition. Even though governance in the 
countryside was already largely autonomous since imperial time, local politics was actually dominated by elites 
and was shaped by the gentry, clans and kinship. Mao tried to establish a communistic rural political mechanism 
by settling up people’s communes, which did not exist long. After de-collectivization by the end of the Mao-Era, 
some villagers in Guangxi decided to elect their own leaders to fill the organizational vacuum and reestablish 
local order. This turned out to be the first village election in the history of China. Along with the fact that the 
central leadership also had the intention to integrate this new institution of VCs into the hierarchy under the 
township which somehow replaced the abolished people’s communes (Note 1), this initiative of self-governance 
has then come a long way since the initial experiments commenced some thirty years ago. 
Notwithstanding enormous opposition encountered, the first national law providing for the election of VC 
officials, the Organic Law of Village Committee was formally introduced in 1987. Facing strong oppositions 
from all levels and in particular from some leading personals of the Party, a great deal of compromise had to be 
made and the law could therefore only be on a provisional basis. According to the decision made on a national 
meeting held jointly by the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee and the Ministry of Civic 
Affairs in 1990, village elections were stipulated to be held nationwide. Yet it should be noticed that even after 
the promulgation of this law, the system of villagers’ self-governing remained only limitedly realized and the 
requirement of holding democratic VC elections was actually widely ignored, for the reason that this law fell far 
short of creating a functional electoral institution, as well as of proscribing election principles and rules which 
confirm to international election standards. 
Only with the passage of the revised version of the Organic Law of Village Committee in 1998 did the village 
elections and self-governance enter a new stage. Much more concrete than the older version, this law specifies, 
“the villagers’ committee is a grassroots autonomous organization of people for self-management, self-education 
and self-service. It is formed by democratic elections and democratic policy-making, democratic management 
and democratic supervision.” (Note 2) The articles of this new law introduced a number of detailed and 
universally recognized electoral procedures that guaranteed electoral openness, fairness and competitiveness, 
such as publication of the voter list before voting, free nomination, multiple candidacy, secret booths and 
reduction of proxy voting. 
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Whereas the 1987 Organic Law did not have the legal authority to take on provinces that refused to comply with 
village elections, this new law mandated provinces to implement village elections and to adopt supplementary 
regulations, which helped promote and regulate elections throughout the countryside. Though to some extent still 
strongly intervened or affected by township governments or Party branches, today in almost all Chinese 
provinces, this sort of elections of VCs has already completed at least 5 rounds. (Note 3) It took nearly 20 years 
since the first villagers’ committee emerged in Guangxi, notwithstanding this tardy change of terms did reflect a 
positive step in the development of the village elections and village democracy.  
Despite many “grey blanks” which still remain somehow vague in the new regulations about the VC election, 
there are some valuable improvements and innovations to be detected, particularly concerning the electoral 
procedure. A good example is that the method haixuan (direct domination of candidates) is more and more 
widely adopted during the procedure of nomination after 1998. From a fieldwork conducted by Richard Levy 
(2007), we can learn that in Guangdong great attention is paid to the procedural aspects such as the selection of 
village election committee, voting proxies secret ballots and secret voting booths. In Zhejiang, starting from 
1998, villagers increasingly nominate candidates directly and the number of candidates also increase accordingly. 
In the 2005 village elections, the haixuan method is adopted by 16,546 villages, which constitutes 48.8% of the 
total voting area; some counties even achieve 100% rate. By observing several VC elections in Jiangsu and 
Jiangxi in both 1999 and 2002, Xiaoteng Tang (2007, 158-162) confirms that during the process of nomination, 
there is a significant transformation from appointment of townships or Party branches to a higher level of 
competition to be detected, during which the haixuan method plays the most important role. 
3. Political Outcomes of the Village Elections 
3.1 Institutional Outcomes  
With the introduction of village elections, village politics has experienced an enormous change in various ways. 
These changes have accordingly affected the political behavior of 3 million “village officials” and the welfare of 
about 650,000 villages all over China. (Note 4) A growing body of literature has studied the nature of village 
elections and considered the political outcomes of the elections in depth, such as their impact on village power 
structure, village governance and even daily life of normal mass villagers. Among them, there are actually 
immense debates about the democratic quality and the factual effects these elections brought on. Despite the 
different viewpoints and verdicts, this body of literature does provide useful firsthand data and insights into the 
subject of village-level elections. One of the most remarkable features attracting the focus of many observers is 
the institutional impact of these elections. 
Through the years, village elections have undergone different stages, well from a non-competitive to a 
semi-competitive, and gradually to a competitive stage. A survey shows that most elections have 
multi-candidates in most areas of Zhejiang and in some cases the elections are often even unable to produce a 
full VC thanks of the high degree of competitiveness. (Note 5) Based on a nationwide sample surveys of villager 
opinions, Shi Tianjian (2006) indicates that 53% of the villagers polled report that in their villages more than one 
candidate runs for office in the 1993 election, whereas in 2002, the percentage rises to 70. Apart from that, 26 
provinces have explicitly adopted the above mentioned method of haixuan as a required nomination process, 
which makes up another step toward the standardization of the elections. 
The creation of this new democratic mechanism has provided gradual but great changes to traditional rural 
political relationship and offered new ways of conducting politics. Regardless of wide variations and many 
contradictions across China’s countryside, the so far great efforts made by the Chinese party-state and the 
innovative participation of villagers have contributed to the fact, that many elements of democratic elections and 
village self-governance are becoming increasingly standardized and institutionalized. With the implementation 
of the Organic Law and other provincial supplementary regulations, such aspects as voter privacy and freedom 
of choice are at least to some extend strengthened. Since 1987, when the Organic Law first institutionalized 
village elections, electoral rights have steadily been refined. For the first time, new concepts like open 
nomination, election campaigns, secret voting and open counts are required and set in the law. The significance 
of these concepts are not just several lines in the code, but moreover also an affirmation of people’s democratic 
rights.  
Giving the common view that there has been a long absence of democracy and self governance in rural China, 
the contemporary village election then carries deeper meanings concerning the political culture. As Liu Yawei 
(2009) highlights, this preliminary exercise of democracy has “notably introduced legal procedures of elections 
into a culture that never entertained open and free elections”. (Liu, pp. 3-4) In this new context, the execution of 
village elections is gradually accepted as a valuable alternative to the otherwise opaque and mysterious methods 
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of selecting local leaders. Yes the limitation of these elections can never be underestimated, but once promised to 
the people, taking away this democratic right that has been previously denied to any particular group would be 
enormously hard.  
3.2 Impact on Different Rural Political Organizations 
The introduction of the new electoral practice has brought fresh air into the basic-level power hierarchy, which 
was previously dominated by the higher-level governments or local Party branches. First, the relationship 
between VCs and township governments becomes complicated and equally equivocal, for the reason that the 
Organic Law supports the VCs to act and administrate autonomously, while VCs also have the obligation to 
implement the disciplined tasks which the state and Party hand down. To the fact that all administrative activities 
related to village elections are organized by local governments, township leaders belong to the most important 
determinators of the variation in village democracy. Thus, to a large extent, the success of village elections 
depends on whether township leaders support or oppose them. As Kennedy categorizes in his study based on a 
research of 18 village elections conducted in three counties between 2002 and 2004, there are 3 different 
attitudes of township authorities toward VC elections, which are those of support, of support but not 
whole-heartedly and of opposition. Nevertheless, village elections have to some degree changed the source of 
rural power as the legitimacy of the governing power in the village now comes from voters rather than from 
direct appointments of the township governments. Although a serie of practical problems show no evidence of a 
total abolishment of township governments in the near future, this reduction of mid-level authority can still 
directly lead to a simplification of the size of township governments. 
Second, this basic-level democratic practice also makes the position and function of local Party branches more 
vague and sophisticated. The new Organic Law in 1998 gives specific power to VCs while just defines the Party 
branches vaguely as the “leadership core” among village-level organizations. For some time, the village Party 
branches have lost their absolute influence in local governance to the elected VCs. The occasions are not seldom 
that these two parts come into hard confrontations. To deal with this issue, Party branches have to adapt to the 
new division of power and find a new way to share it with VCs. The most common method to be seen is to 
practice their strong influence or even to intervene during the nomination process, as both Shi and Kennedy 
suggest in their works. A more newly emerging phenomenon shows that some local governments and officials 
increasingly encourage village cadres to conduct the yijiantiao (hold concurrent positons in both committees). In 
his research Levy takes note of a significant high percentage of party members on the VCs in Guanggong, 
especially as VC leaders. As possible reason he considers it to be highly connected to the fact that the elected 
non-party leaders are often recruited into the Party, with the hope of maintaining control of VCs. Another feature 
attracting greater attention is the so-called two-ballot system, a system that allows even those villagers who are 
not in the Party to participate in nominating candidates for Party branch positions. Even though not stipulated by 
national regulations, in many places passing this popularity test is well accepted as a requirement for the 
qualified nominees. Thomas Bernstein (2006) also notices this new transformation and finds out that if a Party 
secretary runs for VC office and does not win, he will be replaced by someone in whom villagers have greater 
confidence as demonstrated in a kind of open primary election. Conversely, a winning VC chair who is still not a 
Party member will be recruited into the CCP and eventually promoted to the secretarial post.  
3.3 Impact on Village Leaders and Villagers 
The implementation of direct elections involves several hundred million Chinese peasants, who have hardly 
experienced any democracy. The introduction of VC elections opens up an evolutionary path leading to a brand 
new political atmosphere in the Chinese countryside, just as quite a number of scholarship based on fieldworks 
and surveys shows. One of the most obvious perspectives is the effect on the grassroots leaders and their 
relationship to ordinary villagers is to be and grassroots leaders. Through the elections of VCs, changes have 
been inevitably brought to the village power structure and rural leaders as well. According to He, these elections 
transfer and redistribute power in favor of the elected VCs and have thus a direct effect on the political behavior 
of those elected village leaders. Though they still receive pressure from higher-level authorities, they eventually 
become more responsible and accountable to villagers. He also takes a view that the village power has shifted 
from old cadres to new village chiefs, which are younger and better educated, equipped with better financial 
understanding, and also quite noteworthy, a larger amount of them are non-communists. Somewhat contrary to 
He’s last point, Levy observes that Guangdong has the highest rate of village leaders who are also party 
secretaries or hold a position in the Party branch. But concurrently, he agrees that there has been a trend of the 
rise of nengren (rural entrepreneurial strata) into the VC through elections, which he thinks reflects the 
combination of struggle and cooperation between two groups of rural elites, of the new, more economically 
based one and the other the old, more politically based one. A common view is shared that village officials with 
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extensive family and personal ties with officials at higher levels may better protect their village from pressures 
from above or get villagers jobs in township enterprises. 
The effects and influence of these elections on the villagers have indeed attracted huge bulk of international 
attention devoted to political reforms in rural China. Almost all the observers agree that the enthusiasm of 
villagers toward elections has increased and they impressively participate in politics with more awareness and 
right sense. This exercise of democracy has gradually cultivated a sense of political ownership as well as a new 
value system among the Chinese villagers, who barely had any leverage in bargaining with the powerful 
government. Kennedy observes through the surface of an unexpected universal dissatisfaction with elected 
leaders and discovers that though the approval ratings of those elected leaders are considerably unstable and low, 
rural people still exhibit strong support for the electoral process. Kevin O’Brien (2006) meanwhile puts his 
attention on the relation between village elections and the emerging concept of citizenship. He takes the view 
that villagers are more and more eager to become involved in local politics, with the Organic law they are 
empowered to induce resistance to leaders and fight for their political rights. He describes the VC election as “a 
breeding ground for citizenship rights” (O’Brien, pp. 388), while the villagers are best thought of as occupying a 
intermediate position between subjects and citizens. O’Brien’s viewpoint of citizenship is to some extend 
supported by He, as he furthermore lays emphasize on various linkages of the elections with citizenship and rural 
political economy. The rational intension of villagers to protect and develop their interests and benefits, which 
are closely binded to the collective wealth controlled by the VCs, drives them to be more participated in the local 
politics. Thus, village elections can take roots and subsequently transform villagers into modern citizens.    
Another feature to be noted, even usually not considered overly important, concerns the women in the villages. 
Many old and new factors make it traditionally difficult for women to be considerably involved in the rural 
politics in China. A number of both Western and Chinese scholars have devoted their focus on the political 
participation of women at the local level and assessed the impact of elections on women’s lives. In his study on 
some VC elections in Guangdong and Henan, Levy takes highlights an obvious percentage of women on VCs, 
despite controversial suggestions to increase female representation, such as replacing a male victor if no woman 
is elected, or simply being appointed by the above authorities. Levy’s view is supported by He, as he analyses 
the data he collected based on his field-work in Zhejiang. However by deepening the research, he indicates that 
there is an evident gap between men and women concerning the political attitudes and enthusiasm. Women are 
still disadvantaged through an inadequate representation in the VCs and the few representatives are mostly 
allocated secondary roles. (Note 6) But at the same time he also acknowledges a gradual improvement of 
women’s political status and increasing positive attitudes toward politics with the help of legal force and even 
various forms of political intervention.     
3.4 Influences on Rural Governance 
Given its authoritarian character in China, this kind of “pre-democratic” elections in a Leninist party-state seems 
quite spectacular. It is estimated that China's leaders have opted not just to keep elections but also to strengthen 
the electoral system so villagers will realize that it is their own elected village leaders, not the central leadership 
or the Party, who bear responsibility for problems at the local level. Cases of rural resistance and tension 
involving large number of people, which the Chinese government calls “collective incidents’’, have been 
increasing amazingly in the last years. (Note 7) Yet the fact that almost all of the demonstrations and riots take 
place in the countryside are directed at local leaders, not at the central leadership, is evidence that elections have 
indeed made villagers feel the fault for their problems lies with the local leadership. 
The emergence of the new democratic mechanism has brought up new compliance and cooperations mode to the 
old rural hierarchy, which has traditionally been much simpler with the character of just order and obey. 
Kennedy develops a selective policy implementation hypothesis, in which he compares the implementation of 
VC elections with other responsibilities of local cadres such as burden reduction, revenue collection or birth 
control, applying the concepts of “hard targets” and “soft targets” raised by Li and O’Brien. (Note 8) Based on 
interviews and analysis he argues that whether or not the implementation of the Organic Law belongs to the hard 
targets of rural cadres would have immense effect on the quality of the elections. The local cadres in townships 
or Party branches are obliged to fulfill the targets, but they may have no idea who they will be dealing with after 
the election in villages, so they will certainly either try to interfere in the elections, or adapt themselves to the 
newly elected VCs. For this reason, the working relationship between VCs, townships and Party branches is 
redefined. 
Theories of democracy argue that these grassroots elections can open an access to the power for common rural 
citizens. In their recent assessment of village elections O’Brien and Han propose a distinction between “access to 
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power” and “exercise of power” and suggest laying more emphasis on the complementary transformation of 
exercising power. One of the most important features is the financial management and transparency supervision 
of the rural administration. In order to enhance transparency and thus raise trust in the probity of village leaders, 
the 1998 Organic Law already mandates that certain village affairs need to be publicized at least twice a year, 
with the focus on financial matters. In his recent research Alpermann examines the specialized control groups 
consisting of villagers in different provinces, with the aim of supervising veracity of published items and in 
particular financial aspects of village governance. Based on the research conducted in Guangdong and Henan, 
Levy also takes a view at the quality of increasing democratic supervision and reducing corruption in rural China. 
Nonetheless, both Alpermann and Levy somehow acknowledge the low levels of villagers’ trust in the accuracy 
of transparency-related publications, as well as limitation of the effects of different village-level systems of 
combating corruption. 
4. Relative Limitations 
Since the first experiment of village election, China’s rural grassroots democratic reform has experienced 
significant transformation in recent years, especially after the promulgation and the revision of the Organic Law. 
While it appears understandable to explain the attention paid to the improvements and positive impact of this 
basic-level political reform in rural China, the factual effectiveness and outcomes can never be easily 
overestimated. From the very beginning of the appearance of these basic-level elections, critical and skeptical 
voices have been expressed at various sections throughout the legislation process and the implementation. Since 
the Organic Law is written in broad language, the room for interpretation is quite large. Again given the wide 
variations existing between different localities of the Chinese countryside, there is not surprisingly a wide 
variation in the quality and character of village governments throughout China and the extent of those changes 
and their impacts remain furthermore somehow hard to gauge.  
In the 1987 Organic Law, there is an obvious absence of enforcement and adjudication. Detailed articles are still 
hard to be found in the revised new Organic Law, nor in the provincial regulations. Because of that, many of the 
rules of village elections are inconsistent and hardly conform to universal election standards. Quite noteworthy is 
that the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) at the top play a key role in supervising and promoting the election 
implementation, while its subordinates, the provincial and local civil affairs officials, are at the same time 
responsible for conducting elections. Despite their great efforts to promote village democracy, putting the MoCA 
and its local bureaus at the center of the electoral process seems problematic. As a result, such institutions as an 
independent electoral commission is absent, which makes one of the greatest importance of the standardization 
of a democratic election. This absence makes the MoCA accordingly impossible to effectively supervise and 
promote the implementation of elections in the Chinese countryside. Meanwhile, the MoCA is in fact one of the 
least powerful ministries in the central government and its local bureaus are actually more dependent on the local 
authorities. (Note 9) The multi-role of MoCA puts itself in a difficult situation if occasions of conflicts of 
interests occur, which are unfortunately not rare.  
Even where VC elections are considerably democratically conducted, given the traditional political culture in 
China, they still can not escape the influence or intervention of the higher-level authorities and the Party. 
Violations of election rules occur because townships and Party branches have a vital interest in the outcome of 
village elections. This interference in village elections is one way in which township officials have weakened the 
competitiveness of the elections in order to restrict campaigns and to manipulate the electoral process. The 
occasion that the candidates are appointed by township governments or by party secretaries is often to be 
encountered. But this kind of appointment faces inevitably resistance from villagers, for instance through not 
voting for the official nominated candidates or making the elections fail to produce any leader. As an empirical 
study shows, only about 35% of respondents were satisfied with the nomination process when the candidates 
were directly appointed by townships or the Party, while the figure went up to 70% if the villagers were able to 
elect candidates. (Note 10)   
Another feature demonstrating the drawback in the elections is the increase of vote-buying. Distinguished from 
lapiao (canvass for votes through appropriate channels), maipiao (offer money to voters) is illegitimate but a de 
facto increasingly wide-spread phenomena during the electoral process. In several counties in Zhejiang, for 
example, almost a third of the interviewees reported that they witnessed various activities of vote-buying. (Note 
11) In a famous case which happened in Shanxi, the winner promised and did pay approximately 145,000 RMB 
for the office of a vice leader. The vote-buying exists more often not in form of cash, but rather in the forms of 
distributing cigarettes, small gifts, offering free meals and sometimes even promising of free seeds or cable TV 
hook-up to the villagers. This sort of “unhealthy practices” have caught since long academic as well as official 
attentions, yet there seems to be no obvious solution to this problem until now, particularly since there is no 
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unambiguous definition of vote-buying in the law and the regulations dealing with electoral violations do not 
cover village-level elections.  
It is almost common knowledge that the traditional rural Chinese society was and still is a one with prevalent 
kinship culture. Therefore, the elections not only receive influence from the township and the Party, but the 
lineage also plays a role not to be underestimated, particularly in those poorer villages without multi-surnames. 
This culture of kinship expresses its influence on the villagers’ voting behaviour, in which they may nominate 
and elect inefficient or incapable leaders in order to protect the benefits of their own lineage. Once in power, the 
elected leaders are more likely to represent only their own clan’s interests, in issues like land distribution or birth 
control. For this reason, the lineage division in the villages expresses a relatively high degree of effect on the 
procedure and results of the elections, resulting to an exacerbation of this division through the elections and 
leading to a less efficient village governance, as well as difficulties of bringing more common wealth to all 
villagers or better co-operation with higher authorities and the Party branches.      
5. Tentative Conclusion and Prospect 
Over the past thirty years, great economic, political and social transformations have taken place in rural China. 
In the context of those changes, rural politics has also experienced enormous development, while the village 
elections attract most of the domestic and international focus on China’s democratic reform. With the highlights 
of the promulgation and the revision of the Organic Law, which sets up a milestone in the institutionalization 
process of the basic-level elections, village-level elections, together with the crucial improvement of village 
governance they brought on, have already placed China on an irreversible track toward more democratic and 
transparent rural politics. The village election, seen against China’s long tradition of rural elitism and 
authoritarianism, is believed to be only the start of a long democratic transition from the grassroots. After 
studying the cases and analysing the data he collected, Kennedy concludes “that democratic practices have 
become more widespread and institutionalized.” (Kennedy, 2009, pp. 393) This idea is shared by O’Brien and 
Han as they acknowledge that village elections have to some extent made policies and leaders more acceptable to 
voters, enhanced trust in local cadres, increased popular political awareness, and even nurtured a sense of 
citizenship. 
Yet, the limitations and drawbacks of the contemporary elections should by no means be neglected and one 
could hardly exaggerate their actual impact. The urgency of continued improvements to village elections ought 
to be considerably valued, as Tan writes in his recent essay: “Village elections are presently at a crossroad: 
processes and rules still must be improved and further delays will only undermine the credibility of the entire 
reform effort.” (Tan, 2009, pp. 415) As suggestions to improve the institutionalization and the standardization of 
these elections, he asks for the introduction of independent and separate electoral commissions instead of 
elections being arranged by MoCA, allowing higher level of candidate-initiated nomination in the form of such 
as the haixuan, as well as the synchronization of elections dates in order to make the conduction of elections 
more cost-effective and avoid chaos which may occur during the balloting.  
After a decade of elections in the Chinese countryside, increasing numbers of scholars, government officials and 
election practitioners tend to hope that this democratic mechanism should have wider and deeper meaning for 
China’s ongoing political reform, for instance the extension of direct elections to village party secretaries, to 
urban politics, and in particular, to the next higher administrative level of townships. Confronted by the 
challenges of elected village leaders and the resistance of villagers they receive, some local leaders are motivated 
to employ election in townships as a new way of political ruling. With the inspiration of the 1998 Buyun election 
in Sichuan, many local experiments continued all over China, including electing the township government 
leaders, party secretaries, and even county magistrate. All these progresses are being made in the context of 
direct village elections. Despite those successful pioneers, the anticipated boom of this political experiments did 
not take place since the opposition from national leaders and the existing structural institutions are far greater 
than the driving forces. In a well-received speech at Harvard University in late 2003, Premier Wen claimed that 
China did not have the prerequisites for holding higher-level elections. (Note 12) By expressing this point of 
view, a clear signal was given that the Hu-Wen leading team had no plans to upgrade the elections above 
village-level on a regular basis or on a large scale.  
Just like a lot of other reforms in the Chinese history, the village elections in contemporary China is to be 
characterized as a mixed bag of results. Truly this democratic exercise of village elections in contemporary 
China is not the first one in the Chinese history. The briefly experimented grassroots political reforms of the late 
Qing and Republic could not be completed due to the war environment and social disorder. Ironically they 
exacerbated the social tension, triggered greater instability and even revolutions which finally led to the collapse 
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of the regimes. Certainly history does not repeat itself, but it may hold lesson for the future. The practice of 
direct village elections involves several hundred million Chinese voters who have already experienced these 
procedures and are getting increasingly familiar with the standardized procedures. This can be indeed a 
democracy seminar promised by Peng Zhen, China’s leading advocate of direct village democracy. (Note 13) So 
which direction to go from here? Given all the improvements and also contradictories of the village elections, a 
definitive answer can hardly to reached and of course there is still a long march for China toward democracy and 
self-governance. 
References  
Alpermann, Björn. (2009). Institutionalizing Village Governance in China. Journal of Contemporary 
China, vol. 18, no. 60, 397-409. 
Bernstein, Thomas J. (2006). Village Democracy and Its Limits. ASIEN 99, April 2006, 29-41. 
Burns, John. (1988). Political Participation in Rural China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fan, Jie, Herberer, Thomas, & Taubmann, Wolfgang. (2006). Rural China: Economical and Social Change in 
the Late Twentieth Century. New York: M.E.Sharpe. 
He, Baogang. (2007). Rural Democracy in China: The Rule of Village Elections. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
He, Baogang, & Lang Youxing. (2002). Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pingheng (Seeking A Balance Between 
Democracy and Authority). Wuhan: Huazhong Normal University Press.  
Kennedy, John J. (2002). The Face of “Grassroots Democracy” in Rural China: Real Versus Cosmetic Elections. 
Asian Survey, 42/3, 456-482. 
---. (2007). The Implementation of Village Elections and Tax-for-Free Reform in Rural Northwest China. In 
Perry, Elizabeth, & Goldman, Merle (Eds.), Grassroots Political Reform In Contemporary China (pp. 48-74). 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
---. (2009). Legitimacy with Chinese Characteristics: “Two Increases, One Reduction”. Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 60, 391-395. 
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. (2006). Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era. New York, M.E.Sharpe. 
Levy, Richard. (2007). Village Elections, Transparency and Anticorruption: Henan and Guangdong Provinces. 
In Perry, Elizabeth, & Goldman, Merle (Eds.), Grassroots Political Reform In Contemporary China (pp. 20-47). 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Li, Lianjiang, & O’Brien, Kevin J. (2008). Protest Leadership in Rural China. The China Quarterly, 193, 1–23. 
Liu, Yawei: a statement presented at the Roundtable on Village Elections in China, Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, July 8, 2002. [Online] Available: http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1039.pdf 
(March 15, 2009)  
Manion, Melanie. (2009). How To Assess Village Elections in China. Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, 
no. 60, 379-383. 
O’Brien, Kevin J., & Han, Rongbin. (2009). Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China. Journal 
of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 60, 359-378. 
O’Brien, Kevin. (2006). Village, Elections and Citizenship in Contemrorary China. In Dittmer, Lowell, & Liu, 
Guoli (Eds.), China’s Deep Reform (pp. 381-404). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the People’s Republic of China. [Online] Available: 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/laws/organicLawVillComm.php (November 21, 2010) 
Shi, Tianjian. (2006). Village Committee Elections in China. In Dittmer, Lowell, & Liu, Guoli (Eds.), China’s 
Deep Reform (pp. 353-380). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Tan, Qingshan. (2006). Village Elections in China, Democratizing the Countryside. New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press.  
---. (2009). Building Democratic Infrastructure: Village Electoral Institutions. Journal of Contemporary 
China, vol. 18, no. 60, 411-420. 
Tang Xiaoteng. (2007). Jiceng minzhu xuanju yu nongcun shehui chonggou (Democratic Election and 
Reconstruction of Rural Societies). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. 
www.ccsenet.org/ach                     Asian Culture and History                   Vol. 3, No. 1; January 2011 
                                                          ISSN 1916-9655   E-ISSN 1916-9663 22
Notes 
Note 1. For the transformation of the people’s communes to village committees, see John Burns, pp. 88; Fan Jie, 
Thomas Heberer, & Wolfgang Taubmann, pp. 194-196. 
Note 2. This is from article 2 of the Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the People’s Republic of China. 
Translated from the original Chinese version. 
Note 3. For detailed information of the observation, see Richard Levy, pp. 24-25.  
Note 4. While Willy Wo-Lap Lam states the figure as “more than 90% of the nation’s 680,000 VCs”, see Willy 
Wo-Lap Lam, pp. 113. 
Note 5. The survey is conducted by He Baogang and Lang Youxing, see He Baogang and Lang Youxing, pp. 
248-257.    
Note 6. For a concrete study on women’s participation in the elections and their roles in the VCs, see Kevin 
O’Brien, pp. 390.  
Note 7. “The number jumped from 8,706 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2005, with about 40 per cent of them occurring in 
the countryside.” From: Li Lianjiang and Kevin J. O’Brien, pp. 4 
Note 8. These concepts are annouced by Li Lianjiang and Kevin O’Brien. John J. Kennedy agreed with them and 
adopted them in his study. 
Note 9. This view of the MoCA is held by Tianjian Shi, see Shi Tianjian, pp. 357.   
Note 10. For a detailed listing of the figures, see John J. Kennedy (2002), pp. 476-478. 
Note 11. Various case of vote buying are recorded in He Baogang, pp. 58-59; He Baogang and Lang Youxing, 
pp. 270-274.   
Note 12. Part of the content of this speech is translated and interpreted in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, pp. 109. 
Note 13. For Peng Zhen’s attitude towards China’s democratic future, see Tan Qingshan (2006), pp. 84-86. 
